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1.  Introduction 
 
Given the current drive among developing and transitional countries to 
decentralize expenditures and revenues to subnational governments, it is important to ask 
not only whether fiscal decentralization influences economic growth, but also how fiscal 
decentralization may influence economic growth.  What evidence exists on the direct 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth is conflicting at best 
and lacks, for the most part, a convincing argument in either direction on the direct effect 
of fiscal decentralization.  The same may be said for the theoretical development and 
empirical evidence on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
macroeconomic stability.   
In this paper we examine the current state of knowledge in the economics 
literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth; 
invetigate empirically the extent of such a relationship; and analyze whether fiscal 
decentralization also indirectly influences economic growth through its impact on 
macroeconomic stability.  As decentralization moves to the forefront of policy options 
being considered by developing and transitional countries and often figures prominently 
among the prescriptions offered by international donor organizations, it becomes more 
important to understand better the relationship between decentralization, macroeconomic 
stability, and economic growth.  If fiscal decentralization positively or negatively 
influences economic growth directly or indirectly (the latter though the macroeconomic 
stability channel), then policymakers need to be aware of these relationships when 
formulating and implementing decentralization policy.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  First, we briefly review the 
literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization, macroeconomic stability, 
and economic growth.  Second, we develop an augmented neoclassical model of 
economic growth that incorporates both the potential indirect effect of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth through macroeconomic stability and the potential 
direct effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. Third, using an international 
panel data set, we estimate the impact of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic 
stability and economic growth.  The last section summarizes and reviews the policy 
implications of our findings. 
2.  Review of the Literature 
While the direct relationship between decentralization and growth is not one of 
the conventionally addressed issues in the theory of fiscal federalism, it has received a 
significant amount of attention in the empirical literature in recent years.1  Whether or not 
a direct relationship exists between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, 
however, remains, an unanswered question.2  The static proposition that fiscal 
decentralization enhances economic efficiency may have a corresponding effect in the 
dynamic setting of economic growth (Oates 1993).  Of course, this linkage can be 
derailed if fiscal decentralization does not function effectively.3  Others have argued that 
decentralization may control the Leviathan, although the evidence on this hypothesis is 
                                                 
1 Considerable attention has also been paid to the determinants of fiscal decentralization.  For reviews of 
this literature, see, among others, Oates (1999), Panizza (1999), and Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003). 
2 See, for example, Xie, Zou, and Davoodi (1999), Zhang and Zou (1998), Lin and Liu (2000), and 
Thiessen (2003) for empirical analyses of the relationship between between fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth. 
3 Bahl and Linn (1992),  Prud'homme (1995), Tanzi (1996), and Bahl (1999) have questioned whether or 
not voting mechanisms and mobility function well enough in developing economies to allow the realization 
of efficiency gains associated with decentralization. 
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also mixed.4  Some have argued that decentralization may also serve to preserve and 
promote the development of markets (Weingast 1995, Qian and Weingast 1997, Cao, 
Qian and Weingast 1999).  A problem, however, is that these arguments for 
decentralization may be susceptible to the contention that subnational governments in 
developing and transitional economies lack sufficient capacity relative to the central 
government (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman 1997).   
Nevertheless, most authors arguing for and against using fiscal decentralization as 
a policy option in developing and transitional economies have implicitly recognized the 
potential influence of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability (Prud’homme 
1995, McLure 1995, Sewell 1996, Fornasari, Webb, and Zou 2000, Tanzi 2000).  The 
theory of design of fiscal decentralization suggests a number of potential tradeoffs 
between efficiency and other objectives such as a more equal distribution of resources 
across regions or macroeconomic stability.  The classical view of this issue contends that 
macroeconomic policy should solely be the responsibility of the central government and 
not at all the responsibility of subnational governments, more recently, a number of 
authors have argued that devolving at least some measure of macroeconomic policy to 
subnational governments can promote, not hinder, macroeconomic stability (Gramlich 
1995, Shah 1999, Rodden and Wibbels 2002). 
On the negative side, some have argued that the apparent disregard of some 
subnational governments for budget constraints in decentralized systems suggests that 
fiscal decentralization per se aggravates macroeconomic instability or at least presents 
                                                 
4 Marlow (1988) argues that decentralization is negatively associated with government size; Anderson and 
Van den Berg (1998) fail to detect a statistically significant relationship between decentralization and 
government size; Stein (1999) argues that decentralization’s may reduce or increase government size, 
dependent upon the extent of vertical imbalance; Jin and Zou (2002) and Rodden (2003) find that 
expenditure decentralization and smaller vertical imbalance control government size. 
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another obstacle to resolving chronic fiscal imbalance (Rodden 2002 and Rodden, 
Eskeland and Litvack 2003).  Where macroeconomic instability predated 
decentralization, for example, in Argentina and Brazil, decentralization has made the 
solutions more complicated in general but not impossible (Dillinger, Perry and Webb 
2000).  However, in many countries, the presence of a soft-budget constraint at the local 
level of government remains a threat to macroeconomic stability (Bahl 1999 and Stein 
1999).   
The empirical evidence on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
macroeconomic stability does not provide any definitive conclusion on the direction or 
significance of the relationship.  Lagged inflation does not appear to significantly 
influence government size but it does appear that decentralization affects government 
size (Jin and Zou 2002).  There also appears to be an almost 1-to-1 correspondence 
between increases in subnational deficits and central government expenditures and 
deficits in the subsequent period (Fornasari, Webb and Zou 2000).  On the other hand, 
others have argued that no clear relationship appears to exist between decentralization 
and the level of inflation (Treisman 2000 and Rodden and Wibbels 2002). In summary, 
with the influence of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, whether 
decentralization significantly influences macroeconomic stability still is an unanswered 
question.   
3.  A Model of Decentralization, Macroeconomic Stability, and Growth 
Our objectives in this section are first to account for the direct relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth; and second, to incorporate the 
potential influence of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability into the 
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aggregate production function; and therefore examine the indirect influence of 
decentralization on growth through its impact on macroeconomic stability.  While the 
direct relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth has been 
previously examined in the literature, the indirect influence of fiscal decentralization on 
growth through macroeconomic stability has not been previously studied. 
We develop an augmented neoclassical model of economic growth, which 
includes, among other variables, the accumulation of human and physical capital, to 
examine the role played by fiscal decentralization.  We extend the model by assuming 
that the standard term for technological progress can be disaggregated into exogenous 
technical progress, the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, and 
the effect of decentralization on macroeconomic stability.  By augmenting the model, we 
can explicitly examine how decentralization may indirectly influence economic growth 
through its impact on macroeconomic stability.  We note that the disaggregation of the 
exogenous technical progress term is consistent with the literature and adheres to the 
conditional convergence hypothesis (Barro 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, 1997).   
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for the entire economy  so that 
production at time t is given by (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992 and Islam 1995) 
θϕβα
tttttt LGHKVY =  [1]
 
where α, β, ϕ, θ > 0 and α + β + ϕ + θ ≥ 1.  Yt is output, Vt the level of technology and 
other institutional factors, Lt is labor, and Kt, Ht, and Gt are the stocks of private, human, 
and public capital at time t, respectively.  We define Vt as the product of the level of 
technology and other institutional factors at time t or 
tttt PDAV =  [2]
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where At is the level of technology, Dt the level of fiscal decentralization, and Pt 
measures inflation or the level of macroeconomic stability.5  Note that Dt is synonymous 
with the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on output.  If fiscal decentralization 
indirectly influences output through its impact on inflation, certius paribus, then it will 
indirectly influence economic output through Pt.  We note that disaggregating exogenous 
technological progress should not be interpreted as inflation or decentralization affecting 
economic growth through technological progress.  If one expands the theoretical model, it 
becomes apparent that inflation, decentralization, and technological progress affect the 
physical inputs separately, that is, technological progress is not a composite function of 
decentralization.   
 We further assume that L and A grow exogenously at rates n and g,6 respectively, 
and that the price level is a function of, among other things, fiscal decentralization or 
),( 1ttt XDgP =  [3]
 
where 1tX  is a vector of other exogenous variables explaining the behavior of 
macrostability over time, including the money supply.  At this time, for theoretical 
simplicity, we assume that Dt is uncorrelated with 1tX .
7 
                                                 
5 Decentralization is typically measured by the ratio of total subnational government expenditures 
(revenues) to total government expenditures (revenues) and this measure is bounded between zero and one. 
6 Following Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), we assume that the rate of depreciation is uniform across all 
types of reproducible capital for theoretical simplicity.  See Lucas (1988) and Tondl (1999) for alternative 
approaches to the question of depreciation. 
7 If decentralization, macrostability, and output were endogenously related, then we would have to modify 
our analysis to incorporate the potential correlation between D and X1.  The empirical evidence to date, 
however, does not appear to support the argument for an endogenous relationship between decentralization 
through inflation to economic growth.  We examine this question in detail in the following sections. 
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 We assume that physical capital and human capital are subject to decreasing 
returns to scale.  This implies that the economy, over the long-run, will tend to constant 
private capital-labor, human capital-labor, and public capital-labor ratios.8  Once steady 
state output is achieved, additional increases in per capita output can only be achieved 
through increases in capital productivity or increases in the level of decentralization 
(assuming that the overall effect of decentralization on economic growth is positive).9  
Decentralization may thus affect output through two channels, a potential direct effect on 
output, and a series of potential indirect effects, one of which is macrostability.10 
To determine the influence of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, we 
must first determine the steady state levels of the physical inputs in the production 
function.  We assume that the same production function applies to all forms of 
reproducible capital and consumption so that one unit of capital can be costlessly 
transformed into one unit of consumption and vice versa.  Assuming decreasing marginal 
returns to all forms of reproducible capital; that no combination of capital inputs exhibits 
constant marginal returns; expanding Vt , and taking the natural logarithm yields from (1) 
and (2) the steady state level of output per unit of labor or 
                                                 
8 The growth model specified in Equation 1 can be either a Solow-augmented neoclassical growth model 
with constant returns to scale for all production factors or an endogenous growth model with increasing 
returns to scale for all production factors.  Also, if any combination of the capital inputs exhibits constant 
returns to scale then (1) would similarly be characterized as an endogenous growth model.  Senhadji (1999) 
notes that a large part of the empirical growth literature supports the assumption of decreasing returns to 
capital. 
9 While changes in resource endowments (the discovery of new resources or new developments such as a 
cure for AIDS) may affect short-term capital-labor ratios, these changes would not necessarily affect the 
steady state capital-labor ratio unless these changes influence capital productivity. 
10 Policies that lead to a permanent increase in the steady state capital-labor ratio cannot lead to long-run 
per capita growth, unless A is steadily increasing. Since the convergence to the new steady state may take 
years to occur, fiscal policy can still lead to higher output growth rates for a significant period of time, even 
though the neoclassical model might imply that these policies would affect only the level of output and not 





























Thus, the steady state output is dependent upon the accumulation of reproducible capital, 
the stock of technology, the direct effect of decentralization on output, and the indirect 
effect of decentralization through the macrostability channel.   






yd −= λ  [5]
  
where  λ = (n + g + δ )(1 - α - β - ϕ).  Defining y0 as the initial level of per capita output, 







































The advantage of this theoretical specification over the ones used in previous 
papers is that it allows for the explicit examination of the out-of-steady-state dynamics.  
In addition, our theoretical specification also makes explicit the difference between the 
bounded institutional factors in the production function and the physical inputs in the 
production function.  The bounded institutional factors directly influence economic 
growth while the physical inputs are weighted by the ratio of their output share to labor's 
share of output.  Finally, our theoretical specification explicitly captures the unobservable 
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initial conditions in the theoretical model, providing support for our error components 
estimation approach below. 
Two problems may arise with our derivation of the steady state production 
function and the equation for the convergence to the steady state output level.  First, if 
countries have permanent differences in technology, then these differences would enter as 
part of the error term and be positively correlated with initial per capita output.  
Permanent variations in technology could bias the estimated coefficient on initial per 
capita output toward zero.  However, the literature has yet to find convincing evidence to 
support the contention that countries have permanent differences in technology.  Second, 
while countries may not have permanent variations in technology, they may have 
permanent variations in their institutional factors (colonial legacy, legal system, climate, 
geographical region) that would also enter as part of the error term.  To control for these 
institutional factors, we will employ a two-way fixed error components model in our 
empirical estimations. 
4.  Empirical Estimation: The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization 
We now turn to the task of determining whether empirical support exists for the 
hypotheses of the direct and indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth.  As in the case of several more recent studies of the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth, we employ a panel data set of developed and 
developing countries.  We first discuss the data sources and methodology before 
presenting the results of our empirical investigations. 
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4.1  The Measurement of Fiscal Decentralization 
 The most serious difficulty we face in the cross-country study of fiscal 
decentralization is how to properly measure the extent of decentralization.  Ideally, we 
would be able to construct a panel data set of measures of fiscal decentralization that 
effectively quantified the activities of subnational governments resulting from 
autonomous or independent decisions of subnational governments.  This would require 
classifying those revenues and expenditures that are under the effective control of the 
central government as central government activities, regardless of the level of 
government at which these revenues or expenditures occurred.  Likewise, activities that 
were under the control of subnational governments, even if they were funded by the 
central government, would be classified as subnational government activities.  
Constructing such a panel data set would require information on: (i) the nature of grants 
and transfers received by subnational governments (for example, lump-sum versus 
conditional); (ii) the structure of the tax system to determine whether and how revenues 
were shared; (iii) the discretion of subnational governments to levy and collect taxes and 
to change their bases and rates; (iv) the discretion granted to subnational governments to 
spend resources to meet the needs of their constituents; and (v) the overall level of 
political autonomy of subnational governments. 
 Unfortunately, we cannot readily address these issues with the available data.  As 
with many other empirical studies of fiscal decentralization, we employ the International 
Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics Annual Yearbook (GFS) as the primary 
data source for revenues and expenditures of national and subnational governments.  
While the GFS system reports information on grants and transfers between the various 
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levels of government, it does not contain information on whether the grants and transfers 
are under the control of the central or recipient level of government or if the grants are 
conditional, block, or lump-sum.  The GFS system also does not report information on 
the nature of transfers.  Cross-sectional and time-series data on the number and size of 
subnational governments is sketchy at best for developed countries and virtually non-
existent for developing and transitional countries, except in those cases where technical 
assistance providers have conducted surveys of subnational governments.   
 It is this lack of information that has led to the use of a measure of fiscal 
decentralization that is typically constructed as a ratio of subnational government 
expenditures (revenues) to general government expenditures (revenues).  We are, as 
Oates (1972) concluded, left with the standard, albeit imperfect, measures of fiscal 
decentralization based on revenue and expenditure data.  We, as many of the other studies 
that have preceded us, thus define fiscal decentralization in one dimension, that is, as the 
share of subnational government revenues to general government revenues or the share of 
subnational government expenditures to general government expenditures.11 
In our analysis, specifically, we use GFS data at the consolidated central 
government, regional and state government, and local government levels.  For those 
countries that do not report consolidated central government data, we substitute data on 
the budgetary central government.12  Of the 180-plus potential countries in the GFS data 
set, we selected those countries that reported revenues and expenditures for at least the 
                                                 
11 See Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) for a discussion of the pitfalls associated with the conventional measurement 
of fiscal decentralization.  The OECD dataset suggested by Ebel and Yilmaz, however, includes only data 
for six countries on a period of only three years (1997-1999).  While some studies of fiscal decentralization 
have attempted to construct measures of decentralization net of grants and transfers and net of certain types 
of expenditures, we do not construct such measures, as we are not able to ascertain, with any degree of 
certainty, whether these techniques reduce or enhance the bias already present in our measures of fiscal 
decentralization. 
12 This is consistent with previous examinations of fiscal decentralization in the literature. 
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central government and at least one level of subnational government.13  This selection 
process resulted in an unbalanced base panel data set of 982 observations for 52 
developed and developing countries with observations ranging from 1972 to 1997. 
We then calculated two measures of fiscal decentralization: (1) the ratio of total 
subnational government revenues to general government revenues and (2) the ratio of 
total subnational government expenditures to general government expenditures.  These 
two measures are the standard measures of fiscal decentralization that have been widely 
used in the previous studies of determinants and outcomes of fiscal decentralization.14 
When we combine the data extracted from the GFS with the data extracted from the other 
data sources, the size of the data set is reduced from 1,000 observations to 610 
observations due to missing observations in the socio-economic data sets.  We note again 
that the panel data set is unbalanced; we do not create linear approximations of the 
missing data points; nor do we construct averages over periods of time to balance the data 
set.15 
Our approach is to examine the potential impact of decentralization in the full 
sample of countries using a two-way fixed effects model.16  We then split the sample into 
sub-samples of developing and developing and transitional countries to investigate 
                                                 
13We did not include those countries that stopped reporting revenue and expenditure information prior to 
1990 and those countries whose reported data were mathematically inconsistent.  We did include countries 
that reported zero or minimal expenditures or revenues for at least one subnational level of government. 
14 While some studies of fiscal decentralization have attempted to construct measures of decentralization 
net of grants and transfers and net of certain types of expenditures, we do not construct such measures, as 
we are not able to ascertain, with any degree of certainty, whether these techniques reduce or enhance the 
bias already present in our measures of fiscal decentralization.  See, for example, Woller and Phillips 
(1998) and Lin and Liu (2000). 
15 A linear approximation, which may merely reflect the time-wise average of the series around the missing 
data points, is likely to obscure the variability in the series that may arise, in part, due to the influence of 
fiscal decentralization. Linear approximation may also introduce bias into the series depending upon which 
observations are used to create the approximations for the missing data points. It is entirely possible that the 
observations may reflect a period in time in which the structure of the economy is significantly different 
from other periods in time (during an oil or policy shock, for example). 
16 See Baltagi (2001) for a discussion of the two-way fixed effects error component estimator. 
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whether the influence of decentralization is dependent upon the level of development.  
These estimations allow us to test the hypotheses presented in the theoretical model.  
4.2  Fiscal Decentralization and Macroeconomic Stability 
 We hypothesize that the inflation rate is determined by the rate of economic 
growth, the growth of the money supply, and, among things, fiscal decentralization.  We 
specify the base two-way fixed effects error components estimator for inflation as: 
itititititit uZyMDP ++++= '321 δβββ  [7]
 
where P is the annual change in the consumer price index, D is the measure of fiscal 
decentralization discussed above, M is the measure of M2 as a percentage of GDP, y is 
GDP per capita, and the Z matrix includes several additional control regressors, including 
openness to international trade, tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, Gross Domestic 
Investment as percentage of GDP, and population.17  All variables are expressed in logs. 
We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% significance level using a 
modified Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation.18  Respecifying the model in first 
differences, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
 Testing for the presence of endogeneity of fiscal decentralization in (7)19, we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for fiscal decentralization with respect to the 
                                                 
17 We would prefer to examine the potential impact of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability as 
proxied by the misery index (inflation rate plus unemployment rate).  Unfortunately, we lack sufficient data 
on unemployment across countries and time to construct a misery index variable. 
18 When specified in levels, the modified Durbin-Watson test statistic for unbalanced panel data is 0.157 
while the Breusch-Godrey test statistic is 563.25, both rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation 
at the 1% level.  When respecified in first differences, the modified Durbin-Watson test statistic is 1.898   
while the Breusch-Godfrey test statistic is 70.27.   We fail the reject the null hypothesis with any significant 
degree of confidence. 
19 See, among others, Hausman (1978), Hausman and Taylor (1981), and Wooldrige (2002) for a discussion 
of testing for endogeneity in the presence of an unbalanced panel data set. 
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inflation rate.20  We do, however, reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level of 
significance for M2 as a percentage of GDP and for per capita GDP.  Based on this result, 
we instrument for the first difference of M2 as a percentage of GDP with the two-period 
lagged level of M2 as a percentage of GDP.  We also instrument for the first difference of 
per capita GDP with the two-period lagged level of per capita GDP.21  While we 
recognize that the tests for endogeneity with unbalanced panel data may be of relatively 
low power, our failure to reject to null hypothesis of exogeneity for decentralization is 
consistent with the rest of the decentralization literature. 
 We then examine whether the random effects GLS estimator or fixed effects 
Within estimator is more appropriate for the estimation of (7).  While we would prefer to 
use the random effects estimator to avoid the loss of degrees of freedom associated with 
the use of the Within estimator, we reject the null hypothesis that the regressors and 
effects are uncorrelated.  As this result suggests that the random effects estimator is 
inconsistent, we use the fixed effects estimator for the estimation of the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and inflation.  Finally, we examine whether the fixed 
effects are jointly significant, that is, whether the time and country specific effects are 
significant.  Using these results, we specify the estimable form of Equation (7) as a two-
way fixed effects model. 
From this paper’s perspective, the most important result of the full sample 
estimations is the negative and statistically significant relationship between revenue 
decentralization and the rate of inflation.  The estimated coefficient for revenue 
                                                 
20 We also fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for openness to international trade, tax revenues 
as a percentage of GDP, population growth, and Gross Domestic Savings as a percentage of GDP.  The test 
statistics are available upon request.   
21 We instrument for the endogenous regressors using the two-period lagged level of the regressor in 
question.  See Baltagi (2001) for a discussion of these instrumental variables approach with panel data. 
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decentralization is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (Table 1).  A 1 percent 
increase in revenue decentralization appears to induce, for the countries in the sample, an 
approximate 0.3 percent decrease in the growth of the consumer price index.  The 
estimated coefficient for revenue decentralization also appears to be robust to the 
inclusion of other regressors, including total population, defense expenditures, and 
urbanization.  Note, however, that the estimated coefficient for expenditure 
decentralization is not statistically significant.  Thus it appears that while the 
decentralization of expenditures does not affect inflation, countries with a more 
decentralized system of revenue assignments tend to experience more stable 
macroeconomic environments.  Perhaps the ability of subnational governments to 
mobilize their own revenues puts less strain on the central government budget and 
ultimately on inflation. 
Turning to the sub-sample estimations, we again find that revenue 
decentralization appears to negatively influence the rate of inflation for the sub-samples 
of developed and developing and transitional countries.22  For the sub-sample of 
developed countries, the estimated coefficient for revenue decentralization is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level and suggests that a 1 percent increase in the level of 
revenue decentralization induces a 0.4 percent decrease in the inflation rate for the 
developed countries in the sample (Table 1).  For the sub-sample of developing and 
transitional countries, the estimated coefficient for revenue decentralization is also 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level and appears to suggest that a 1 percent 
increase in the level of decentralization induces a 0.13 percent decrease in the rate of 
                                                 
22 We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the time-specific effects are jointly equal to zero but are able to 
reject the null hypothesis for the country-specific effects and thus present the results for the one-way fixed 
country effects IV Within estimator in Table 4. 
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inflation.  The estimated coefficient for expenditure decentralization is not statistically 
significant in either the developed or the developing country sub-samples.   
The results of our analysis, even in light of the necessary cautionary notes, are 
quite striking.  Revenue decentralization appears to promote, and not hinder, as has been 
often previously suggested by some in the literature, price stability among the sample 
countries.  That this result is consistent, although at the lower order of magnitude, for the 
sub-sample of developing countries, suggests that our findings are not dependent upon 
the level of development. 
Our empirical results support the previous arguments in the literature that fiscal 
decentralization may enhance price stability and contradict the a priori arguments of 
those who caution that decentralization, at a minimum, presents an obstacle to achieving 
macroeconomic stability (Prud’homme 1995).  With respect to the empirical literature, 
our findings contradict the previous findings that decentralization either “locks in” 
(Treisman 2000) the current rate of inflation or has no statistically discernable effect 
(Rodden and Wibbels 2002).  We find that revenue decentralization may, in fact, lower 
the rate of inflation. 
4.3  Decentralization, Macrostability, and Economic Growth 
We now turn to the question of the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth, that is, whether the static proposition that fiscal decentralization is efficiency 
enhancing has a corresponding proposition in the dynamic setting of economic growth.  
The theoretical model suggests that a direct relationship between decentralization and 
economic growth is possible, yet the question remains whether the relationship can be 
empirically substantiated in a fully specified model that controls, among other things, for 
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the indirect effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth.  We now examine 
whether fiscal decentralization directly affects economic growth and also whether there is 
an indirect impact on economic growth through the inflation channel.  
Drawing on the neoclassical economic growth literature, we specify the base 
estimation equation for growth in per capita GDP as: 
itititititititit uZPGHKDy ++++++= '54321 δβββββ  [8]
 
where D and P are as previously discussed; K is private capital as proxied by gross 
domestic private fixed investment; H is human capital as proxied by infant mortality; and 
G is public capital as proxied by gross domestic public investment. We would prefer to 
measure human capital using schooling data; however, panel data on education levels are 
currently not of sufficient quantity to include in the panel data set.   The use of infant 
mortality as a measure of human capital, however, is consistent with the economic 
growth literature. The Z matrix contains a number of control regressors, including 
openness to international trade, population, democratic governance, tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP, and defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP.  All variables are 
expressed in logs.  We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1 percent 
significance level.23  Re-specifying the model in first differences, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation.   
                                                 
23 When specified in levels, the modified Durbin-Watson test statistic for unbalanced panel data is 0.164 
while the Breusch-Godrey test statistic is 563.35, both rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation 
at the 1% level.  When respecified in first differences, the modified Durbin-Watson test statistic is 1.74 
while the Breusch-Godfrey test statistic is 69.55.   We fail the reject the null hypothesis with any significant 
degree of confidence. 
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 Following the methodology presented in the previous subsection, we first test for 
the endogeneity of the regressors.24  We fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity 
for fiscal decentralization with respect to growth in per capita GDP, a result that supports 
the previous findings in the literature. We do, however, reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity for the inflation rate and gross domestic fixed private and public investment 
per capita.  We again reject the null hypothesis that the regressors and effects are 
uncorrelated, suggesting that the fixed effects estimator is more appropriate for the task 
of estimating (8).  As before, we instrument for these endogeneous regressors with the 
two-period lagged level of the regressor in question.   
 The empirical results are presented in Table 2.  Among the most important 
empirical findings of this paper is the failure to detect, for the full sample of countries, a 
statistically significant direct relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in 
per capita GDP.  While the estimated coefficient for expenditure decentralization is 
positive, it does not approach any meaningful level of significance.  The estimated 
coefficient for revenue decentralization is negative but insignificant.  The inclusion of the 
control regressors, to include total population, defense expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP, openness to international trade, and democratic governance, does not improve the 
significance of either of the estimated coefficients for fiscal decentralization.  We also 
examined whether a non-monotonic relationship exists between decentralization and 
growth by including the square of decentralization as an additional variable.  The 
estimated coefficients for the squared decentralization terms were also insignificant.  Our 
findings appear to support those of in the literature who have failed to detect a 
statistically significant direct relationship between decentralization and economic growth. 
                                                 
24 The test statistics are available upon request.   
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 While we fail to observe evidence of a direct relationship between 
decentralization and growth, we find empirical support for an indirect relationship 
between decentralization and growth through the inflation channel.  As noted in the 
previous section, revenue decentralization appears to reduce the rate of inflation in the 
sample countries.  The results in this section verify that a negative relationship exists 
between inflation and economic growth.  Thus, an increase in revenue decentralization, 
all else being equal, would appear to reduce the rate of inflation over time and, in turn, 
indirectly enhance economic growth.  We believe that this first evidence on the indirect 
influence of decentralization on growth is intriguing as it supports the contention that 
decentralization has an indirect effect on economic growth through its impact on 
inflation.   
For the sub-sample of developed countries, we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the country-specific effects are jointly equal to zero and thus use the one-way IV 
Within estimator.  From the results in Table 2, we note that there appears to be a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in per 
capita GDP.  The estimated coefficients for expenditure and revenue decentralization are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  While the estimated coefficients for 
revenue decentralization appear to be robust to the inclusion of the control regressors 
(total population, defense expenditures, M2 as a percentage of GDP), the estimated 
coefficients for expenditure decentralization appear to be fragile.  For the developed 
countries sub-sample, increases in revenue decentralization lead directly to lower 
economic growth.  On the other hand, the indirect effect of decentralization on growth 
through its impact on inflation is not present for the sub-sample of developed countries.  
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For the sub-sample of developing and transitional countries, we are able to reject 
the null hypothesis that the country and time-specific effects are singularly and jointly 
equal to zero and therefore use the two-way IV Within estimator.  As with the full sample 
estimations, we fail to detect a statistically significant direct relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and growth in per capita GDP.  The estimated coefficients for 
expenditure and revenue decentralization (Table 2) are positive and negative, 
respectively, but insignificant.  As with the full sample of countries, we note that inflation 
appears to significantly and negatively influence growth in per capita GDP and that 
decentralization appears to negatively influence the rate of inflation.  This result would 
appear to suggest that decentralization, for the developing countries in the sample, 
indirectly affects economic growth through the inflation channel.  Unlike some of the 
arguments in the literature, fiscal decentralization does not appear to present an obstacle 
to achieving price stability in the sample developing and transitional countries.   
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the linkages between fiscal decentralization, 
inflation, and economic growth and have found support for the hypothesis that 
decentralization, at a minimum, does not present a threat to price stability in a large 
sample of developed and developing countries.  Our findings suggest that fiscal 
decentralization per se does not create conditions that undermine efforts to achieve price 
stability.  While it is quite clear that poorly designed or implemented fiscal 
decentralization policies may create incentives for subnational governments to 
overborrow relative to their debt-servicing capacity and potentially lead to 
macroeconomic instability, it appears that, by allowing governments at different levels to 
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mobilize their own revenues, decentralization ultimately leads to more stable prices.  The 
mechanism by which this takes place is not well established and it should be investigated 
in the future.  However, an appealing conjecture is that by mobilizing their own tax 
revenues, local governments put less pressure on the central government budgeting, thus 
lowering the chances for larger central government deficits and ultimately increases in 
the money supply and inflation. 
The other significant finding of this paper is that there does not appear to exist a 
direct role for fiscal decentralization in economic growth. However, fiscal 
decentralization appears to have a positive indirect effect on economic growth through its 
beneficial impact on price stability.   
From the perspective of future research, refining the measures of fiscal 
decentralization and macroeconomic stability to include measures of unemployment and 
other dimensions should be the next step of future work.  A more complete understanding 
of the contemporaneous and time-wise causality flows between decentralization, its 
influences, and economic growth, should also be considered avenues for future research.    
Table 1 


































































































       
Degrees of Freedom 388 388 188 188 218 218 
R2 0.25 0.26 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.17 
 
                                                 
25 **, *, and + signify the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respective.  White heteroscedastically 











































































































       
Degrees of Freedom 438 438 218 218 208 208 
R2 0.43 0.43 0.66 0.67 0.40 0.40 
 
                                                 
26 **, *, and + signify the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respective.  White heteroscedastically 





Variable Definition and Source 
Revenue Decentralization Ratio of total subnational government 
revenues, including grants and transfers, to 
the sum of government revenues at the 
subnational and central government level 
 
Government Finance Statistics (2002) 
Expenditure Decentralization Ratio of total subnational government 
expenditures, including grants and 
transfers, to the sum of government 
expenditures at the subnational and central 
government level 
 
Government Finance Statistics (2002) 
Infant Mortality per 1,000 Live Births World Development Indicators (2002) 
Gross Domestic Private Fixed Investment 
Per Capita 
World Development Indicators (2002) 
Gross Domestic Public Fixed Investment 
Per Capital 
World Development Indicators (2002) 
Inflation World Development Indicators (2002) 
Democratic Governance The composite democratic governance 
index ranges from 0 (complete absence of 
civil liberties and political rights) to 1 (full 
political rights and respect and protection 
of civil liberties). 
 
Freedom House (2002) 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita World Development Indicators (2002) 
Urbanization World Development Indicators (2002) 
General government tax revenues as 
percentage of GDP 
Government Finance Statistics (2002) and 
World Development Indicators (2002) 
M2 World Development Indicators (2002) 





Country Observation Period Country Observation Period 
Argentina 1987-1997 Australia 1972-1996 
Austria 1975-1989 Azerbaijan 1994-1997 
Belgium 1978-1988 Bolivia 1986-1997 
Brazil 1981-1994 Bulgaria 1988-1997 
Canada 1974-1995 Chile 1975-1988, 1992-1997 






Dominican Republic 1977, 1980, 1982, 1987, 
1990, 1992, 1996 
Estonia 1992-1996 Fiji 1980-1992 
Finland 1972-1989 France 1975-1989 
Hungary 1982-1989 Indonesia 1981-1993 
India 1975-1996 Ireland 1972-1989 
Israel 1974-1989 Kenya 1977-1984, 1986-1994 
Latvia 1994-1997 Lithuania 1993-1996 
Malaysia 1974-1979, 1981-1997 Mauritius 1975-1985, 1987-1997 
Mexico 1977-1997 Netherlands 1975-1997 
Norway 1972-1991 Panama 1985-1994 
Peru 1990-1995 Philippines 1980-1992 
Paraguay 1974-1980, 1984-1993 Poland 1994-1997 
Romania 
1991-1997 
South Africa 1977, 1980, 1982, 1993, 
1995-1997 
Spain 1975-1989 Sweden 1975-1996 
Switzerland 
1975-1984 
Thailand 1977, 1980, 1982, 1987, 
1990 -1997 
United Kingdom 1973-1995 United States 1972-1997 
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